Introduction
Tackling anti-social behaviour has over the last decade become a government priority. The establishment of the Anti-Social Behaviour Unit in the Home Office in 2003, and, more recently the formation of the Respect Task Force signals the strategic shift in official policy on law and order. As the officially recorded crime rate continues to drop there has been no let up in government pressure to maintain 'law and order' with the passing of a number of pieces of legislation designed to control the range of activities which have become identified as anti-social behaviour In this process, there has been a shift in terminology and the meaning of key terms such as 'disorder', 'crime' and 'anti-social behaviour' with a blurring of the distinctions between them. These terms are increasingly coming to be used interchangeably while terms like 'disorder' which once referred mainly to physical disorder such as vandalism to the control of problem drinkers such as street drinkers, youths or vagrants and prostitutes. There is also a growing belief that these social forms of disorder should and can be controlled through law enforcement (Hope, 199X) . The conceptual slippage involved in current debates about crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour does not, however, detract from the significance given to these various activities, but rather serves as a selfreinforcing discourse that increases their profile and allows inflated claims to be made about their cumulative impact.
There is, however, a discernable shift in emphasis which is taking place involving a decreased concentration on crimes as specific events to a focus on anti-social behaviour and disorder as low level continuous activities which extend beyond the established crime control framework and which require a form of control which moves conventional policing.
It necessarily requires a series of agencies working in combination involving forms of regulation which goes beyond the established boundaries of criminal justice. James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1983) have provided the most effective rationale for linking disorder and anti-social behaviour to crime in their influential and widely referenced 'Broken Windows' thesis, which posits an 'inextricable link' between disorder and crime (See Matthews and Pitts, 2001; Kelling, 2001) . In official circles, this thesis has been used consistently to justify the need to 'get tough' on anti-social behaviour and to nip low-level incidents 'in the bud' before they become more serious.
The growing focus on anti-social behaviour by the government has not occurred without critical comment from academics and journalists.
Leading academic commentators on these issues have seen the increased focus on anti-social behaviour as a shift in a more punitive direction. One of the main reasons given for the increased focus on anti-social behaviour has been the 'perceived inefficiency of the criminal justice system' (Burney, 2005) . Similarly, Peter Squires and Dawn Stephen (2005) (Squires and Stephen, 2005: 3) Squires and Stephen argue that this new focus has involved a shift away from attempts to address the condition of the disadvantaged through welfare policies and strategies of social inclusion and replaced this with an over reliance on discipline, punishment and containment.
In this chapter, we seek to examine the ways in which those ostensibly punitive and disciplinary policies have been interpreted and implemented in the past few years in England and Wales. Drawing on the research conducted in three London boroughs in 2006, we aim to explore the gaps between the rhetoric and reality and between interventions and outcomes 1 . In doing so, we aim to argue that there are substantial difficulties and inconsistencies in the implementation of anti-social behaviour strategies. Although this is paper focuses on a relatively small number of boroughs which were seen to be 'failing', many of the issues discussed in this paper are relevant to many other boroughs in which we have recently visited.
The main problems arose in the process of translating government policy to local areas included:
• Variations in the use and reliability of data collected;
• Problems of definition and the overlaps of categories;
• Different perceptions of anti-social behaviour among different agencies;
• Problems of formulating a strategy of intervention;
• Limited use of anti-social behaviour sanctions;
• Lack of community involvement.
In a recent press release issued in January While not denying that the millions of pounds, the substantial growth of anti-social behaviour personnel and the prioritisation of anti-social behaviour as an issue have all had some impact on anti-social behaviour.
But we want to suggest that in a number of areas that the rate of progress is exaggerated and that the campaign against anti-social behaviour is being driven forward by a myopic and messianic vision which indicates little awareness of the real obstacles to the implementation of this programme.
Variations in the use and reliability of collected data
The starting point for understanding the nature, trends of anti-social behaviour issues in any borough is the gathering and collating of the appropriate data. In the three boroughs we examined, the quality of data collected ranged from poor to very poor. None of the anti-social behaviour officers in the three boroughs were very clear about the type of data they required to develop anything resembling a problem-solving or strategic approach to anti-social behaviour. Instead they relied uncritically on whatever datasets were available and drew on whatever forms of data on anti-social behaviour which was most readily available from the data analysts. The data analysts, for their part, tended to supply that data which was the easiest to access despite any limitations it might have. In one borough, responses to anti-social behaviour were decided upon by anti-social behaviour officers walking around the borough and talking to local residents. While this indicated a commendable desire to keep in touch with the experiences of local residents it hardly provided the basis for developing a rational policy programme.
Since data was being collected on all three boroughs by different agencies using different data systems there was a high likelihood that many incidents were being double or treble counted. Although we did not trace through specific incidents in order to identify how they appeared on the different data systems there was a very high likelihood that those incidents, which cut across the crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour divide were recorded in different ways by different agencies using different data systems. If this process is particularly pronounced in certain boroughs it makes a virtual nonsense of the datasets produced by each borough for its audit.
The problems of definition and the overlapping of categories
Much has been written on the problem of definition in relation to anti- Where as the sixteen offences are too specific and inflexible, the four-fold typology is too general and imprecise for the formulation of data, undertaking analysis or developing interventionist strategies.
While it is the case that the vagueness of the standard definitions of antisocial behaviour makes it difficult to clearly delineate exactly what is mean by anti-social behaviour, the imprecise nature of the definition has the benefit that it can be widely interpreted and considerable discretion can be exercised by those agencies who are charged with addressing this issue.
We should note, however, that the problem of definition is not specific to anti-social behaviour. The categories of crime, for example, are no more or less robust than many of the anti-social behaviour categories. The term 'violence', for example, is extremely broad and subject to considerable degrees of interpretation. The same can be said of other categories such as robbery and theft (Matthews, 2001; Young 1988) . It is just that we have become familiar with these crime categories and attribute them a sense of solidity and precision which in fact they do not have.
It could be argued that some of the anti-social behaviour categories are more reliable and easier to measure than certain categories of crime. The number of youths 'hanging around', the number of cars abandoned and incidents of graffiti, as well as the number of beggars on the street, can be counted with relative ease. Despite this, even the Respect Task Force and those that carry out research on their behalf have shied away from measuring incidents of anti-social behaviour and claim that "the scale and impact of anti-social behaviour can only be measured by grouping the perceptions of those whose lives are affected by such behaviour" (Ipsos MORI, 2007) . In presenting a review of trends in anti-social behaviour MORI engage in an interesting slippage between 'perceptions' and the 'reality' of anti-social behaviour. This statement is an extraordinary, as it is disingenuous. There is no objective reality and the type of empirical surveys on anti-social behaviour (which MORI have themselves conducted) are apparently redundant. Although 'anti-social behaviour' like 'crime' is asocial construction it does not mean that it has not objectivity.
In our study, however, the main issue which arose in relation to the problem of definition was which agency was to take primary responsibility for addressing the issue. Who would take responsibility for deciding which measures were best suited for dealing with specific issues? Without clear lines of responsibility and accountability there is a real danger that the issue falls between a number of stools.
Different perceptions of anti-social behaviour among different agencies
The significance which different agencies attached to different forms of anti-social behaviour was found to vary considerably. There were two major divisions in the three boroughs reviewed. The split between Housing Departments and Community Safety Teams is reflected in the schism which runs through many partnerships which divides anti-social behaviour between that which occurs in public spaces (streets, parks, etc.) and that which takes place in 'private' spaces such as housing estates.
There is also a pronounced difference in the attitudes towards anti-social behaviour amongst Youth services, Social Services, and Educational
Departments on one side and the police on the other. In general, the former group argue for predominantly welfare responses to people in trouble and take objection to the 'criminalisation' of certain activities by the police. Although each borough formally signed up to a 'partnership approach' and inter-agency working, the partnerships tended to gravitate towards a 'stick and carrot' approach which neither satisfied the welfarists or the police. The police often expressed frustration at what they saw as 'soft' policies of the welfarists, while these groups complained of the 'heavy handed and insensitive' ways in which the police and Anti-Social Behaviour officers responded to what were seen as generally low-level incidents carried out by young, disadvantaged and marginalised groups (see Matthews et al. 2007 ).
Problems of formulating interventionist strategies
The lack of accurate and reliable data as well as the difficulties in partnership working created problems in developing effective interventionist policies. Consequently, many of the policies which were developed in the three boroughs were reactive. Alternatively, they were easily swayed by political imperatives and priorities. Because each borough lacked a robust and objective dataset that could form the basis of rational policy programme, issues that were highlighted by the media, the Home Office or local politicians could all too easily change the direction of policy. Consequently, policy programmes were rarely sustained or consistent. Although routine procedures were established for dealing with things like litter, graffiti and abandoned cars policies on most other forms of anti-social behaviour varied immensely over time with issues that were priorities at one time moving down the agenda at other times, irrespective of the objective prevalence of the issue.
Responses in each of the boroughs were therefore inconsistent and patchy. For many issues, there was a lack of clear strategy or tactics, and instead policies were proposed because they fitted with the general council objectives and priorities or because they were seen to be politically correct. Thus, forms of anti-social behaviour which were known to have relatively low number of victims or offenders in the borough were given priority whether or not they reflected the real concerns of residents.
Because interventions were largely reactive, inconsistent, patchy and based on 'feel-good' factors, the impact was often short-term. There was little consideration of the causes of anti-social behaviour in each of the boroughs and the focus was mainly on achieving government targets or realising local government priorities. Potential central government funding was always a consideration and while there were some attempts to respond to local concerns, reference to actual or potential funding possibilities was a significant element in the discursive exchanges between practitioners.
Limited use of anti-social behaviour sanctions
Over for intimidating witness and drug-related civil orders to attach to ASBOs.
In the boroughs we examined, as well as offices we have visited in the course of our research, it was apparent that the development of the various sanctions available was uneven and very selective. As the recent report by the Youth Justice Board has indicated the use of sanctions tended to be more a function of the attitudes and preferences of the agencies involved rather than being tailored to the specific situation or context of the offenders involved (Solanki et al., 2006) .
In the three boroughs, there were found to be considerable variation in the form of anti-social behaviour, which were targeted, and in the sanctions used. In one borough, sanctions were developed against street prostitutes while in other boroughs such sanctions were felt to be inappropriate for this group (see Sagar 2007) . Aggressive and persistent beggars were found to be dealt with in conflicting ways in the three boroughs, with two boroughs using a combination of ASBOs and dispersal orders, while in another they were simply moved on by the police and neighbourhood wardens.
The available range of sanctions, however, were not fully deployed in the three boroughs. Although, ABCs and ASBOs were becoming more widely used with two boroughs having issued seventeen and 20 ASBOs respectively, the third borough had only issued eight ASBOs. One borough had issued ten dispersal orders while the other two had issued none and one. Similarly, one borough had issued eight times as many Parenting Orders than the other two boroughs put together had issued over the previous twelve month period (see table 1 ) 
Lack of community involvement
The relationship between the CDRP and the local communities in the three boroughs examined was found to be at best patchy. Although reference was frequently made to 'community engagement' such engagement was often token and short-lived. One event which was organised in one borough, for example, at which members of the community were invited to participate in a discussion on crime and antsocial behaviour nobody turned up. This was mainly because the event was poorly organised and local residents were not properly informed. It may also be the case that members of the community are less concerned about anti-social behaviour than we are led to believe. In another borough, several anti-social behaviour community panels were organised in four different areas. In all, 20,000 leaflets and letters were sent out and advertisements were placed in the local press. An average of 25 people turned up to each event.
There was also evidence that anti-social behaviour co-ordinators were preoccupied with achieving set targets, organising presentations to the CDRP (designed to show how well they were doing) and writing strategy 
Conclusion
It is evident that when we 'drill down' into the workings of local partnerships that there is a considerable gap between the 'rhetoric' of government-led anti-social behaviour campaigns and their actual interpretation and implementation. The major problem with this campaign is the quality of the data on which campaigns are mobilised coupled with a lack of analysis and evaluation.
Policies do not generally reflect objective problems because it is far from clear exactly what the problem is, while there is little understanding of 'what works'. There are also issues about the management and sharing of data which is available, with all its limitations. The introduction of new 'hotlines' and single non-emergency numbers will predictably compound rather than solve the problems of data gathering.
In place of a rigorous and detailed understanding of anti-social behaviour there is a great deal of creative accounting taking place with many of those involved making exaggerated and unfounded claims about 'success'. Where 'success' in whatever form can be reasonably claimed to have taken place, we do not know that whether it could have been better achieved in any other way and at lesser personal and economic cost. As the machinery of anti-social behaviour grows in scale it is becoming evident that this is not the smooth-running, efficient and effective machine that it is often presented as being.
